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Abstract 
Over a year after the referendum on EU membership, even the broad parameters of the 
legal arrangements of Brexit remain frustratingly unclear. Details are woefully lacking. The 
EU insists that a withdrawal agreement must be settled before discussing any future EU/UK 
(trade) agreement(s). The withdrawal agreement will cover the position of R-EU nationals in 
ƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚǀŝĐĞǀĞƌƐĂĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞh ?ŽƚŚŚĂǀĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚ
law. The UK intends to secure legal continuity and reform through statute and executive 
action. EU law is deeply entwined in UK health law, albeit often indirectly.  No area of health 
law will remain entirely untouched by Brexit. This article considers the implications of the 
withdrawal agreement, and the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, on key aspects of UK health law, and 
argues that the health law community must be attentive to these unfolding processes. [146 
words] 
 
1. Introduction 
Health  W in particular the NHS  W was a key issue in the EU referendum. Many people voted 
to leave the EU on the promise of an extra £350 million a week being paid into the NHS.  
That promise turned out to be unfounded in reality.  Far from improving health, or 
enhancing the NHS, Brexit brings huge challenges for legislators and policymakers who seek 
to secure health care and population health in the UK outside of the EU.  This is because EU 
law has affected health law and policy in the UK for decades  W in many instances since the 
UK joined the EU in the 1970s.
1
  It is deeply entwined in the delivery of health (both 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ
and policy that applies across the whole of the UK. 
This article explores how changes to UK health law, policy and practice, covered by EU law 
since before the UK joined, will be managed immediately post-Brexit.
2
  Before we can 
consider that in any detail, we need to understand what UK health law will lose with EU 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?hŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁŝƐ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐǀĞƌƐĂů ? ?3  Cutting across different areas of EU law, it is 
found in what may seem to be surprising places, especially to health lawyers and those in 
the health policy community. 
                                                          
1
 For an overview, see, e.g., T. Hervey and J. McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
2
 There are also important implications for EU health law without the UK: these will not be covered here. 
3
 T. ,ĞƌǀĞǇ ? ‘h,ĞĂůƚŚ>Ăǁ ?ŝŶ. Barnard and S. Peers, eds, 2nd ed, EU Law (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming 2017). 
If one considers  W as perhaps UK ministers or civil servants may have done  Wthe standard 
headings of EU law, taken either from the EU Treaties
4
 or indeed from a good textbook on 
hůĂǁ ?ŽƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ƵƐĞĚƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĞǁhDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Žƌ
ƚŚĞůŝƐƚŽĨƚŽƉŝĐƐŽĨhůĂǁŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐKĨĨŝĐŝĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂů ?5 one might well imagine that EU law 
has very little to do with health law.  The EU is a body of constrained competences: 
constitutionally it only has the powers conferred upon it by the Member States as expressed 
in the EU Treaties.  The EU Treaties expresƐůǇƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ŽĨ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐĂƌĞ ? ĂƌĞ Ănational 
competence.
6
  Before the 1990s, when the EU legislature was granted formal competence 
to adopt health measures, it relied on implied competence, based on the objectives in 
ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ?  ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂŝƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?  ǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ
adopt public health measures was given to the EU legislature by the Treaty of Maastricht. So 
the direct effects of EU health law on UK health law are limited to the public health field.
7
  
These are significant, covering a wide range of matters contributing to overall population 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ůĂǁ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ Ăŝƌ ĂŶĚ ǁĂƚĞƌ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ, 
ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐƚĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƌĞƐĂƌĐŚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ƐƚĞĞƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ
behaviour through its public health programmes.
8
  
But what is much more important is the indirect effects of EU law on UK health law.  Much 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ŝƐ ďĂƐĞĚon other competence provisions, in particular those on 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?9 When the EU legislature adopts measures in 
ŽƚŚĞƌĨŝĞůĚƐƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ŝƚŝƐŽďůŝŐĞĚƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽ ?
the protection ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ?10  These aspects of EU health legislation include a huge 
range of matters pertaining to the delivery of health and social care in the UK and for its 
population. Non-exhaustively, these include, for people: patient mobility; cross-border 
contracts for health services delivered electronically; protection of patient information and 
privacy; aspects of health insurance; recognition of medical professional qualifications; 
aspects of the migration entitlements of the health and social care workforce, such as 
entitlement to remain in the UK after retiring, to be accompanied by family members 
whatever their nationality, access to a range of social benefits including housing and 
education on the same basis as UK nationals; and aspects of the employment entitlements 
of the health and social care workforce, such as working hours, non-discrimination at work, 
maternity and paternity leave. They also include, again non-exhaustively, pertaining to 
products: transparency of pricing of pharmaceuticals within the health system; liability for 
                                                          
4
 dŚĞ  ‘dƌĞĂƚǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ &ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?  ?d&h ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘dƌĞĂƚǇ ŽŶ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?  ?dh ? ?
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
5
 A formal source of EU law. 
6
 Article 168 (7) TFEU. 
7
 See further, J. Coggon, What Makes Health Public? (Cambridge University Press, 2012); L. Gostin, Public 
Health Law: Power, Duties and Restraints (University of California Press, 2008). 
8
 For a brief overview, see S. Greer, T. Hervey, M. McKee, J. DĂĐŬĞŶďĂĐŚ ?  ‘,ĞĂůƚŚ >Ăǁ ĂŶĚ WŽůŝĐǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?The Lancet 27 March 2013 doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62083-2. See further, M. Flear 
Governing Public Health: EU Law, Regulation and Biopolitics (Hart, 2015).  
9
 ĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ  ‘ĂŶĂƌĞĂǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ĨƌĞĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŐŽŽĚƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ? ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂŶĚ
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĞŶƐƵƌĞĚŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?d&h ? 
10
 dŚŝƐ ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ?and 168 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). 
harm from defective pharmaceuticals, medical devices or medical equipment; safety of 
blood, human tissue and organs; marketing of pharmaceuticals, with special rules for 
 ‘ŽƌƉŚĂŶŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞƐ ? ?ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƚƌŝĂůƐ ?ĂŶŝŵĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ; and aspects of procurement of products 
and services within the NHS.  A wide range of public health matters are also covered, 
especially food safety, and tobacco regulation.
11
 
In addition to Treaty reform and EU legislation, EU health law has been developed through 
ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?^ƵĐŚůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇ ?ŽĨhůĂǁ ?12 ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?13 
provisions of the TFEU, especially those on free movement of the factors of production, and 
on free and fair competition. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has found that EU law on 
free movement of goods, services, workers and freedom of establishment, as well as on 
anti-competitive agreements, and abuse of a dominant position, applies in health contexts. 
There is nothing special about health law that keeps it immune from the application of EU 
free movement and competition law. The way the rules are interpreted within EU law 
matters too: the CJEU often takes into account the special position of health, and a national 
health (insurance) service, when it interprets the relevant rules.
14
 Further, both UK courts 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ :h ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ĂƐ Ă ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ h ůĂǁ ǁŚĞŶ ďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
different interests at issue in health litigation.
15
 
Through its direct, but especially its indirect, effects, there is barely an area of UK health law 
ƚŚĂƚŝƐƵŶƚŽƵĐŚĞĚďǇhŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƚ ƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
with the EU, and what happens to EU law in the UK on Brexit day, will make a significant 
difference to UK health law.  That is why the health law community should be attentive to 
the political processes as they unfold during the two year period beginning on 29 March 
2017, when the UK invoked Article 50 TEU, indicating its intention to leave the EU.   
Of course, it will also be critical for the health law community to be attentive to the effects 
on UK health law of EU/UK relationships further into the future.  But as we know so little 
about what those relationships might be,
16
 the focus in this article is on the immediate 
future. 
                                                          
11
 For details on all of the above, see T. Hervey and J. McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and 
Implications (Cambridge University Press, 2015), parts II-III. 
12
 Validly adopted EU law must be applied in priority over all conflicting national law, whatever its date of 
enactment or normative status, see Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
13
  ‘ŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ h ůĂǁ ĐŽŶĨĞƌ ƵƉŽŶŝ ĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĂďůĞ ŝŶ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů  
courts, see Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
14
 See further, T. Hervey and J. McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp 73-85; 88-97; 98-126; 127-155; 184-210; 229-291; 536-538. 
15
 Article 35 TFEU. See, e.g., Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky Association; Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor; see 
also P. Roderick and A. WŽůůŽĐŬ ? ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ ?Ɛ'ƌĞĂƚZĞƉĞĂůŝůůǁŝůůĂǆĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ ?BMJ Editorial, 357 (2017). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.j2013 (accessed 13 July 2017). 
16
 The political signals are changing all the time, which makes it virtually impossible to develop a sustained 
ůĞŐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?WDdŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ?Ɛ>ĂŶĐĂƐƚĞr House speech on 17 
January 2017 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-
exiting-the-eu-pm-speech) included the now infamous line that  ‘ŶŽĚĞĂůĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂďĂĚĚĞĂůĨŽƌ
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŚĂǀĞĐĂůůĞĚĂ ‘ĐůŝĨĨ-ĞĚŐĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽĚĞĂů ?ƌĞǆŝƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞh<ůĞĂǀĞƐƚŚĞhǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
even negotiating a withdrawal agreement, still less a future EU/UK trade relationship. But ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
The next section of the article sets out the broad parameters of the negotiations and the 
withdrawal agreement, inasmuch as currently available information permits. The third 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ ŬŶŽǁ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ h< ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉůĂŶƐ ĨŽƌ ůĞŐĂl 
certainty and continuity. Throughout, the implications of different processes and outcomes 
for UK health law are analysed. 
 
2. The negotiations and the withdrawal agreement 
2.1 The negotiations 
Many of the parameters of the legal arrangements on Brexit remain unclear.  Details are 
ǁŽĞĨƵůůǇůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ?ƵƚƐŽŵĞĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
position. The overall EU position was agreed (infamously in less than 15 minutes
17
) at a 
 ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂů ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂĚs of state of the 27 Member States in the 
rest of the EU (R-EU) on 29 April 2017,
18
 following a proposal from the European 
Commission and a resolution of the European Parliament.
19
 The European Commission then 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?20 which were adopted by the R-
EU European Council on 22 May 2017. These authorise the European Commission to 
negotiate on behalf of the EU, consistent with Article 50 (2) TEU, which provides that 
negotiations must take place in accordance with the procedure in Article 218 (3) TFEU. The 
R-EU European Council will conclude the withdrawal agreement on behalf of the EU, acting 
by qualified majority, and with the consent of the European Parliament. In other words, no 
one government (other than the UK, of course) has the power to block the withdrawal 
agreement, but the European Parliament does have that power.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
White Paper on Exiting the EU ŵ ? ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚDĂǇ ?Ɛ letter triggering Article 50 TEU on 29 March 
 ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?dŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌƵƐĞƐƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ĚĞĞƉĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?and explicitly states that a 
ĨƵƚƵƌĞ h ?h< ĨƌĞĞ ƚƌĂĚĞ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ƚŚĂŶ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĚĞĞƉ ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŵĂŶǇŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ
partnerships between the EU and its geographical neighbours. See the Financial Times analysis: 
https://ig.ft.com/article-50-annotated/. However, the leaks from the Juncker/May dinner on 29 April 2017, 
reported in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/brexit/juncker-bei-may-das-
desastroese-brexit-dinner-14993605.html. Translation available here: https://www.arcofprosperity.org/the-
brexit-dinner/) suggest quite the opposite.  Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, is 
reported to have left the ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚĞŶƚŝŵĞƐŵŽƌĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůƚŚĂŶŚĞǁĂƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?,ĞĂƉƉ ƌĞŶƚůǇĐĂůůĞĚŶŐĞůĂ
DĞƌŬĞůƚŚĞŵŽƌŶŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌ ?ƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚDĂǇŝƐ ‘ŝŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌ ŶƚŐĂůĂǆǇ ? ? 
17
 I. Wishart, S. Bodoni and D. Simenas, 'European Leaders Back Brexit Negotiating Plan Before Talks' 
Bloomberg (2017) https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-28/eu-says-it-s-already-europe-1-
britain-0-as-brexit-reality-dawns (accessed 13 July 2017). 
18
 European Council, 'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ EŽƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? dh Brussels, 29 April 2017 
EUCO XT 20004/17. 
19
 5 April 2017. 
20
 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations on an agreement 
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal 
from the European Union 3 May 2017 COM(2017) 218 final.  
There is a question about whether the withdrawal agreement might be what is called a 
 ‘ŵŝǆĞĚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?21 covering areas where the EU and Member States share competence. If 
the withdrawal agreement is a mixed agreement, then in order to come into effect, it must 
be ratified both by the EU institutions and by the Member States, in accordance with their 
individual constitutional requirements. In some Member States that gives veto power to 
national, or even regional, parliaments.
22
 If this is required, it will be more difficult to 
conclude the withdrawal agreement. Probably the better view, however, is that the 
withdrawal agreement is covered only by the procedures set out in Article 50 TEU, whatever 
its content, because it is a lex specialis, and the EU is competent to agree it acting alone. 
Ultimately, the CJEU has jurisdiction over such a dispute, although private individuals, NGOs 
and so on do not have locus standi to bring a claim,
23
 so it is difficult to see who might bring 
such litigation unless a particular Member State is thwarted politically. It is possible, for 
instance, if Spain is not satisfied with the arrangements concerning Gibraltar that it might 
challenge the validity of the withdrawal agreement. 
In practice, negotiations did not commence until after the UK general election on 8 June 
2017.  In terms of the sequencing of negotiations, the EU insists that a withdrawal 
agreement must be settled before any future EU/UK trade agreement(s).  Whatever the 
politics, and of course these may ultimately prevail, the legal position suggests that this is 
correct.  The UK cannot negotiate a future relationship with the EU, or vice versa, until the 
UK has ůĞĨƚƚŚĞh ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŽĚŽƐŽǁŽƵůĚďƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ĚƵƚǇŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
binds all EU Member States.
24
   
dŚĞh ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĐŽǀĞƌ: ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? rights, that is, the position of R-EU nationals 
in the UK and vice versa; the financial settlement; the island of Ireland, in particular 
arrangements for the land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; 
the situation for products placed on the EU market before the withdrawal date, including 
live litigation and administrative procedures on the withdrawal date; arrangements for 
material covered by the European Atomic Energy Community; and the governance of the 
withdrawal agreement, including disputes about the continued application of EU law, 
citizens rights; and the application and interpretation of the rest of the withdrawal 
agreement.  
dŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ? dŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Commission issued its transparency policy on 22 May 2017.
25
 The EU has undertaken to 
                                                          
21
 See Case 22/70 ERTA; Cases 3, 4 & 6/76 Kramer; Opinion 1/76 on Inland Waterways; Opinion 2/92 on the 
OECD; Opinion 1/94 on the WTO; the Open Skies rulings; Opinion 2/15 on the EU/Singapore FTA; Article 3 
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https://www.ft.com/content/df6841f4-113e-3b56-9559-61bcc6c3ed11 (accessed 13 July 2017). 
23
 Article 218 (11) TFEU. 
24
 Article 4 (3) TEU. 
25
 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/article-50-negotiations-united-kingdom/european-commissions-
approach-transparency-article-50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en (accessed 13 July 2017). This complies with 
Regulation 1049/2001/EC OJ [2001] 145/43 on public access to EU documents.  
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ Ă  ‘ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? tŚĞƌĞ
documents are shared between the R-EU Member States, the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the European Council, they will also be shared with the public. In this regard, 
the EU institutions may be learning from their experiences over negotiating the (ultimately 
unsuccessful) EU/USA Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In those 
negotiations, the EU found it easier to respond to opposition by making its position open for 
public debate. There is also the very practical issue that documents leak in any event. In the 
h< ? ǁĞ ŵĂǇ ůĞĂƌŶ ŵŽƌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ŽƵƌ ŽǁŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
documents than from official UK sources. It will be important to track the negotiations as 
they unfold, not least because it is not clear who will represent the interests of health in 
those negotiations. We know that Jeremy Hunt, the Health Secretary from 2016-2017 and 
from 2017, does ŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂƐĞĂƚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǆŝƚ ‘ƚŽƉ-ƚĂďůĞ ?ŝŶDĂǇ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?26
dŚĞhŚĂƐƐŚĂƌĞĚĐůĞĂƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŬĞǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƚĞĂŵ ?
and their roles and remit.
27
  On the UK side, by contrast, it is difficult to discern a clear 
overalů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ Žƌ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ ?  ?ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ h< ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŵĞĂŶƐ
both the withdrawal process/agreement and the future EU/UK agreement) should be 
bespoke,
28
 ĂŶĚďĞ ‘ĂŐƌĞĂƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?29  There was also some lack of clarity about who the UK 
neŐŽƚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƐŽŵĞ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĚŝƐĂƌƌĂǇ ? ?30 ĂǀŝĚ ĂǀŝƐ ? ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ǆŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h ŝƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ
overseeing negotiations, and its Permanent Secretary, Oliver Robbins, and Director General, 
Sarah Healey, work closely with Davis.  But there is also the Foreign Office, led by Boris 
Johnson, and indeed the Prime Minister herself, both of whom would normally be expected 
to play a leading role in negotiations of this type. Johnson was alone among UK ministers in 
insisting that the financial settlement should involve the EU paying the UK, and the UK has 
now conceded on this point by accepting that it has liabilities to the EU which it will meet. 
Other key ministers, such as Chancellor Philip HammoŶĚ ?ĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽĨĂǀŽƵƌ ‘ƐŽĨƚĞƌ ?ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐ
of Brexit.
31
 And the reshuffle following the June 2017 election led to more prominence for 
pro-EU ministers.
32
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 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/taskforce-article-50-negotiations-united-
kingdom_en#negotiationdocuments (accessed 15 May 2017). 
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  ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂ DĂǇ P tĞ ǁĂŶƚ Ă ƌĞĚ ? ǁŚŝƚĞ ĂŶĚ ďůƵĞ ƌĞǆŝƚ ?BBC News (2016) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/38223990/theresa-may-we-want-a-red-white-and-blue-brexit (accessed 13 
July 2017). 
29
  ‘ĂƐ ĚĞƐĂƐƚƌƂƐĞ ƌĞǆŝƚ-ŝŶŶĞƌ ? ?Frankfurther Allgemeine (2017) http://www.faz.net/aktuell/brexit/juncker-
bei-may-das-desastroese-brexit-dinner-14993605.html (accessed 13 July 2017). 
30
  ‘ƚĂůĞŽĨƚǁŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƚĞĂŵƐ ? ?Financial Times (2017) https://www.ft.com/content/ca522044-0b0d-11e7-
97d1-5e720a26771b (accessed 13 July 2017). 
31
 'Philip Hammond to prioritise economic prosperity in Brexit talks' The Guardian (2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/16/philip-hammond-brexit-talks-brussels-uk-eu (accessed 13 
July 2017). 
32
  ‘David Davis stripped of his hardline anti-EU minister in department clear-out ĚĂǇƐďĞĨŽƌĞƌĞǆŝƚƚĂůŬƐƐƚĂƌƚ ?
(2017) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/13/david-davis-stripped-hardline-brexit-minister-
department-clear/ (accessed 13 July 2017). 
KďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚǁŝůůĂĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐ
revenues are raised from elsewhere, spending on other matters, including the NHS, will 
inevitably be affected. The UK has now accepted that its financial liabilities to the EU will 
outlast its membership.
33
 Ministers such as Liam Fox have made statements about 
negotiations pertaining to citizens rights.
34
 &Žǆ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ
included in migration figures
35
 affects recruitment to health and research positions, in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚ ‘ƚŚĞďƌŝŐŚƚĞƐƚĂŶĚďĞƐƚ ? ?
dŚĞ h< ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ůĞĂĚ ŝƐ ^ŝƌdŝŵ ĂƌƌŽǁ ? ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ
unexpected and controversial resignation of Sir Ivor Rogers on 3 January 2017, urging civil 
ƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ  ‘ŝůů-ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŵƵĚĚůĞĚ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ
ǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘serious multilateral negotiating experience is in short supply in Whitehall, and 
ƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽƌŝŶƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?.36 But, no matter how experienced, 
how the civil service will negotiate when there is a lack of ministerial consistency is 
fundamentally unclear. The worry that an uncoordinated UK negotiating team will mean 
that important matters, such as health, will be lost in discussions, was noted by the House of 
Commons Health Committee in its Brexit report:  
 ‘Ğ ƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŚĂs a place at the table when ministers of trade and finance 
negotiate trade agreements. My dear ministers of health, if you are not at the table, 
ǇŽƵĂƌĞŽŶƚŚĞŵĞŶƵ ? ?37 
2.2 The withdrawal agreement 
Every aspect of the withdrawal agreement affects UK health law, either directly or 
indirectly. Failure to agree a withdrawal agreement at all will have the most detrimental 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ PƚŚĞƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂ ‘ŶŽ-ĚĞĂů ?Žƌ ‘ĐƌĂƐŚŽƵƚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂůůh ?h<ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĨĂůůďĂĐŬ
on WTO law, or other international cooperative mechanisms if they exist, on Brexit day. 
The most significant, and politically salient, aspect of the withdrawal agreement for the UK 
E,^ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŽƚŚƚŚĞhĂŶĚƚŚĞh<38 agree in principle 
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remain-in-uk (accessed 13 July 2017). 
35
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  ‘^ŝƌ /ǀĂŶ ZŽŐĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ůĞƚƚĞƌ ŝŶ ĨƵůů ? ?The Telegraph (2017) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/03/sir-ivan-rogers-resignation-britains-eu-ambassador-letter/ 
 ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ  ? ? :ƵůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ZŽŐĞƌƐ ? ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŝŶ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ůĞĨƚ ŝŶ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ƚŽ Ă ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ tĞůƐŚ
government. 
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 House of Commons Health Committee, Brexit and health and social care  W people and process 25 April 
2017 HC640, para 9, citing Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, Keynote 
address to the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific, Sixty-fourth session Manila, Philippines, 21 
October 2013. 
that it is a matter of the highest priority to secure the position of R-EU nationals in the UK 
and vice versa ?&ŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚƌĞĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌŵŽƐƚ P
the position of the R-EU nationals who work in health and social care in the UK; the 
arrangements for temporarily migrant patients; and the position of UK nationals who are 
resident in R-EU, many of whom are retired people.  The details of the agreement on each 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǁŝůů ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ Đare, and 
professional licensure, recognition or accreditation, and consequently a profound indirect 
effect on the NHS and social care in the UK. 
Some 140,000 R-EU nationals currently work in the NHS and social care across the UK.
39
  
Looking at doctors alone, one tenth are graduates of non-UK European Economic Area 
countries.  London, Scotland, and the south East of England are particularly reliant on R-EU 
nationals in their health and social care workforce.  In Northern Ireland, many health 
professionals effectively work across the border with the Republic of Ireland throughout 
their working lives.
40
  dŚĞǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ/ƌĞůĂŶĚǁŝůů
need careful oversight, to ensure that the many shared health facilities and activities that 
ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ůŽƐƚ ?  E,^ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ƉŝůŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ
Lincolnshire, which seeks to plug the staffing gap by recruiting 500 GPs from overseas once 
it is rolled out, is reported to have recruited GPs from Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, Greece and 
Spain.
41
 Eight percent of doctors in Wales are from R-EU, where reliance on R-EU workforce 
has increased in recent years.
42
 Applications from R-EU nationals to University nursing 
courses reduced by 24% in July 2017.
43
 Research and teaching hospitals, especially those in 
London, are particularly reliant on R-EU nationals when recruiting the very best 
clinical/research staff: the UK is currently regarded as a top place globally to build such a 
career.
44
 
These R-EU citizens currently enjoy a suite of rights that are readily enforceable, and 
relatively administratively simple to secure.  The entitlements endowed by EU law on 
migrant workers, and their families (irrespective of nationality), as defined by EU law, are 
extensive.  Although they stop short of full UK citizens rights, they reach far beyond 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞ
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  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ PE,^ “ŵĂǇƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŵŽƌĞŶŽŶ-h<ƐƚĂĨĨ ? ?BBC News (2017) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
wales-politics-38981129 (accessed 13 July 2017). 
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  ‘University applicants for nursing courses remain down by 23% at final deadline ? ?Nursing Times (2017) 
https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/education/nursing-course-applicants-remain-down-by-23-at-final-
deadline/7019446.article (accessed 13 July 2017). 
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House of Commons 2017. 
right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality in accessing a huge range of 
employment and social rights: access to employment; mutual recognition of qualifications 
from other EU countries (subject to linguistic competency tests); access to housing, 
education and other welfare benefits; right to access accrued pensions and healthcare on 
retirement in another EU country; right to access healthcare on a temporary basis in 
another EU country (which is often relied up by women giving birth in their original home 
country); and the right to vote in local and European parliamentary elections.   
The details of the withdrawal agreement will have critical implications for the position of 
those R-EU nationals who already work in the UK in health and social care, and for those 
who arrive between now and the date on which the UK leaves the EU (29 March 2019, 
unless the UK and EU agree to extend the negotiating period under Article 50 TEU). Will the 
status of R-EU nationals be assimilated to that of other lawful immigrants to the UK, covered 
ďǇ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƐĞƚ ŽĨ h< ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ h< ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐposition45 
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ?KƌǁŝůůƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽďĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶůĂǁ ?ĂŬŝŶĚ
of lex specialis ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ  ?ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂĨŽƌŵĞƌhDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞ ?dŽǁŚŽŵ
will entitlements apply: everyone lawfully resident in the UK on the date of Brexit, or a 
different date, with transitional arrangements; or to not-yet resident family members of 
those who are lawfully resident in the UK on whatever date is chosen? Will entitlements 
apply only up to a cut off date, or will they reach into the future, for instance, in terms of 
access to higher education for children of R-EU nationals in the UK, or portability of pensions 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞhŝŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇEŽƚĞƐ ?
to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (discussed further below) signal an intention to remove 
rights from EU nationals in the UK should no withdrawal agreement be negotiated.
46
 The 
Bill, if adopted, would give power to the UK government to remove rights arising from 
reciprocal arrangements, without Parliamentary oversight. Such rights include all rights of R-
EU citizens resident in the UK; they also include rights under the EHIC scheme. There is also 
the crucial question of enforcement of rights, discussed below. 
The implications of the financial settlement aspect of the withdrawal agreement will have 
ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ E,^ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
resources for public spending. The precise permutations of these depend of course primarily 
on other government policy, particularly taxation policy. But in the absence of a change of 
direction from the austerity politics of the current government, a call on the public purse in 
the form of the settlement means less available taxation for the NHS. 
In the withdrawal agreement, the intention is to clarify the situation for products placed on 
the EU market before the withdrawal date. To be effective, clarification must include how 
live litigation and administrative procedures on the withdrawal date will be resolved. A 
bewildering array of products are bought by UK-based health or social care providers from 
EU suppliers on a daily basis: ranging from simple tongue depressors to positron emission 
tomography (PET) scanners. These products, and their components, are currently governed 
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 Department for Exiting the EU, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Explanatory Notes 13 July 2017, available 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/en/18005en.pdf, at p 10. 
by EU law that secures their safety and protects consumers/patients. Pharmaceuticals enjoy 
marketing authorisations that permit their sale anywhere in the EU,
47
 and supply chains 
typically involve several EU countries.
48
 The UK currently purchases all of its plasma used for 
anyone born after 1996 from Austria.
49
 The safety of blood,
50
 human organs,
51
 and tissue
52
 
is guaranteed by EU law and regulatory processes. The aim of this aspect of the withdrawal 
agreement is to secure continuity regarding ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ƚĂƌŝĨĨďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ ?ƚŽƚƌĂĚĞ ŝŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞhĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?/ƚ ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ ůĞŐĂů
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚŝŶŝƚƐtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞh ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh
and European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (discussed further below).
53
 
The withdrawal agreement may also include arrangements facilitating the transfer from the 
UK of EU agencies and facilities to R-EU countries. The most important of these for health is 
the European Medicines Agency. The EU has indicated that it will decide on its future 
location by October 2017.
54
 dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞh<ŽĨƚŚĞD ?Ɛ
relocation. Indeed, the UK government seems to have been in denial about the matter until 
relatively recently.
55
 The larger market of the EU, for which marketing authorisations are 
granted by the EMA is likely to mean that pharmaceuticals reach the UK market later than at 
present. The relocation of 700 regulatory specialist jobs means that the pharmaceutical 
industry may move at least some of its operations to the new home of the EMA, for ease of 
interaction with the regulator.
56
 The UK will lose its seat (through the EU) in the ICH.
57
  
There are also some very specific elements of the relocation which may be settled in the 
withdrawal agreement. One is the question of liability for the building rental, reportedly 
ƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƚŽ  ? ? ? ?ŵ ?58 ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŝƐƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞD ?ƐƐƚĂĨĨ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
the issues raised above apply. Furthermore, the relocation of the EMA may well affect the 
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timing of the entry into force of the new Clinical Trials Regulation.
59
 This is due to take place 
once the new portal and database has been created, and adequately tested and audited.
60
 
This process was supposed to be completed by October 2018. But the European Medicines 
ŐĞŶĐǇŚĂƐŶŽǁĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƵŶƚŝů  ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐ  ‘technical 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ/dƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?.61 
Computed Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and PET scanning, some 
cancer treatments (such as radionuclide therapy), biochemical analysis, sterilisation of 
medical equipment, and other diagnostic and therapeutic technologies rely on nuclear 
medicine.
62
 The radioisotopes used in these procedures in the UK are manufactured in 
research reactors based in other countries in the EU (Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, France, 
Germany, Czech Republic). The main supplier is the Belgian-based company IRE.
63
  All of 
these materials are covered by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which 
governs the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the EU, relying on the EU institutions to 
do so. It is our membership of Euratom that allows UK hospitals and clinics to import 
radioisotopes. The withdrawal agreement will need to cover Euratom also. If this matter 
cannot be resolved in the withdrawal agreement, the basis on which all radioisotopes are 
currently lawfully imported into the UK will be removed. At the very least, it would take 
some time for the UK to negotiate a new agreement through the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.
64
 In the meantime, presumably, imports would cease. 
Finally, the terms of agreement on the governance of the withdrawal agreement, will affect 
all the matters discussed above.  Where people or companies have disputes with the UK 
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government about the continued application of EU law, or the application or interpretation 
ŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐĂŐƌĞĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐĂƌĞůĂǁĨƵůůǇ
being marketed in the UK after Brexit day, the agreement itself will determine how those 
ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐĂƌĞƚŽďĞƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ?dŚĞh< ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞhǁŝůůŶŽƚŚĂǀĞ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞh< ? ?65  dŚĞh ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
part of the negotiaƚŝŽŶ ŵƵƐƚ  ‘ďĞĂƌ ŝŶ ŵŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚŝƚƐůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ:h ? ?66  The special and autonomous 
nature of EU law, according to its CJEU and accepted by courts in every Member State, 
including the UK, marks out its distinction from ordinary international law.
67
 It is this 
inherent nature of EU law that leads to its direct effect (that is to say, enforceability at the 
suit of individuals, whether legal or natural persons) and its supremacy (that is to say, its 
application in priority over contradictory national law, whatever the date or type of that 
national law).   
These aspects of EU law have been relied upon by patients, to secure cross-border medical 
services; by health professionals, to secure entitlement to practice; by providers of a range 
of health products or services, seeking to sell their products or services in the UK; and by 
public health campaigners, seeking to ensure that population health measures of EU law are 
interpreted in wayƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ?68  
zĞƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ h ůĂǁ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚĂŬĞ ďĂĐŬ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ĨĂĐĞƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h<
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŵŽƐƚ ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ ƌĞŵŽǀĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?  /ƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ
difficult to reconcile these positions.  The EU would seem to be suggesting that it will accept 
nothing less than oversight by a court (ideally the CJEU, but potentially a bespoke court). 
The UK position appears more consistent with the kinds of arbitration arrangements more 
common to resolve international trade disputes. It may be possible for the UK to accept the 
h ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŚĞƌĞ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĐůĞĂƌ ĚĂƚĞ ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
governance arrangements under the withdrawal agreement will cease to apply (i.e, a date 
ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞh<ĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ ‘ƚĂŬĞŶďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ? ?/ĨƚŚĂƚ ŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ
likely to be a date far into the future, given the nature of the rights of R-EU citizens in the UK 
and vice versa, including, for instance, access to pensions on the basis of national insurance 
contributions made while the UK was a member of the EU.  
To summarise, although of course not all legal texts are yet available, we have some 
information about the upcoming negotiations and the likely details of the withdrawal 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝon on transparency. Health lawyers can, and 
should, therefore continue to ensure that health remains as much in view as it was during 
the referendum campaign, as the negotiations progress; scrutinise proposals for their likely 
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effects on the NHS, and on population health; and seek to secure the best possible 
outcomes for health in the withdrawal agreement.  
 
3. dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ?Đƚ ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĞĂƚZĞƉĞĂůŝůů ? ? 
The UK government intends to secure legal continuity in the aftermath of Brexit day through 
statutory means: a European Union (Withdrawal) Act (the Withdrawal Act/Bill).
69
 It will take 
some time to disentangle UK law from EU law: indeed it may take a long time, perhaps as 
ŵƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐŝŶ ? ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐŽƵƚ ? ?dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŝƌst indicated through its White Paper 
on >ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ h70 how it envisages avoiding legal 
vacuums that would otherwise appear on the day EU law ceases to apply in the UK. The 
approach adopted in the Withdrawal Bill gives the UK the time it needs to make changes to 
the law, while securing legal certainty for people and businesses in the UK in the meantime. 
Although the text for the Withdrawal Bill is available at the time of writing, it is yet to 
complete its passage through the Commons and Lords. Given the political situation, and 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ DĂǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ŽŵŵŽŶƐ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ
follows is necessarily speculative. The June 2017 general election resulted in a narrowing of 
ƚŚĞ DĂǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵajority, and this may make it more difficult for the Bill to be 
adopted without amendments. There will be more clarity as the Bill is debated by 
Parliament, and scrutinized by external stakeholders. 
The Withdrawal Bill provides that, on Brexit day, the European Communities Act 1972 will 
be repealed.
71
 The European Communities Act is the provision by which the UK 
constitutionally complies with its EU membership obligations. On Brexit day, to secure 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ?hůĂǁǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ  ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ?72 will become a formal source of UK law.73 
Treaty provisions  W including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights74  W will no longer be a 
formal source of UK law after Brexit day. All EU Regulations
75
 and any directly effective 
Treaty provisions
76
 will be converted into UK law. In effect, there will be a new formal 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ h< ůĂǁ ? tĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĐĂůů ŝƚ  ‘h ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ůĂǁ ? ? Žƌ  ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ h ůĂǁ ? ?77 The 
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 At the time of writing, the UK government had published the Withdrawal Bill, but it had not been adopted. 
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 Department for Exiting the EU, tŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 1. 
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 That is to say, Treaty provisions (including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), and EU Regulations. 
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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 3. 
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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 5 (4). See also White Paper, Para 2.23. 
75
 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 3 (2) (a). See also White Paper, Para 2.4. 
76
 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 3, clause 4. See also White Paper, Para 2.11.  
77
 Department for Exiting the European Union, 'European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Explanatory Notes' (2017), p. 
 ? ?ĐĂůůŝƚ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨhůĂǁŝŶƚŽĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐůĂǁĐŽǀĞƌƐĂůůhůĂǁƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐůĂǁ ?
ĂŶĚŝƐ ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƌĞǆŝƚĚĂǇ ?78
So provisions of health law such as the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products Regulation 
1394/2007; the Data Protection Regulation 2016/679; Regulation 883/2004, which includes 
the provisions on the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), which allow UK nationals to 
access medical treatments when in other EU countries; and a host of others, which are 
currently part of UK law because of the European Communities Act 1972, will become part 
of UK law via the provisions of the Withdrawal Act on Brexit day. However, provisions such 
as Regulation 536/2014 on clinical trials, which have yet to enter into effect although they 
have been agreed by the EU legislature, are not covered by the terms of the Withdrawal Bill 
as it currently stands. 
Where aspects of UK health law derive from EU law that is not directly applicable, it is 
already incorporated into UK law. This is particularly the case for Directives, which typically 
become part of UK law either through legislation, or through statutory instruments, using 
the enabling power in the European Communities Act.
79
 Where implementation of 
Directives has been carried out through primary legislation, that legislation will continue to 
be part of UK law. So, for instance, the UK complies with its obligations in the Human Tissue 
and Cells Directive through the Human Tissue Act 2004, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
2004, and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Those Acts will remain part of 
UK law after the European Communities Act is no longer in force. But, where incorporation 
of EU law into UK law has been carried out by secondary legislation, without the European 
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĐƚ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚ ‘ĨĂůůĂǁĂǇ ? ?ĂƐŝƚƐĞŶĂďůŝŶŐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌďĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ?
To avoid this unintended effect, the Withdrawal Act will also preserve those laws as a 
source of UK law.
80
 For instance, some 65 provisions of national law and soft law, including 
the NHS (Cross-Border Healthcare) Regulations 2013
81
 and the Cross Border Healthcare and 
Patient Mobility  W Guidance for the NHS,82 ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
2011/24 in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Under the Withdrawal Act, 
ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĂƐ ‘h-ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?83 
The Withdrawal Bill groups all of these new sources of UK law (EU-derived 
ůĂǁ ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ h ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ  ‘h-ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ
 ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚhůĂǁ ? ?84   
/Ŷ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ŽƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ŝůůĂůƐŽ ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ h
ůĂǁ ?ǁŝůůďĞĂŵĞŶĚĞĚ ? ‘ĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?85 Some of this amending of existing law will 
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 Welsh Government, Cross Border Healthcare and Patient Mobility - Guidance for the NHS, 14 August 2015 
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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 2.  
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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 6 (7). 
85
 tŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌ ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĞĞĂůƐŽƉ ? ‘ĂƚĂƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚǁĞĐŚŽŽƐĞ ? ? 
be done by legislation. The White Paper explicitly mentions a customs bill and an 
ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶďŝůů ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ĚƚŽďĞ ‘ƐŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐǁŝůůĐŚĂŶŐĞĨor any 
hĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂůƌĞĂĚǇƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƌŵŽǀŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ? ?86  From the point of view of R-hĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐǁŚŽĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ďĞůŽŶŐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞh<
precisely because they are EU citizens and the UK is a member of the EU, or indeed UK 
citizens resident in EU-27 countries, everything will change,
87
 whatever the Parliamentary 
intent is.  As noted above, this is likely to have significant ramifications for health and social 
care staffing, as well as recruitment to health research posts in the UK.
88
 The details of the 
immigration bill, when it eventually emerges, will be something to which health lawyers 
should pay close and careful attention. 
Controversially, under the Withdrawal Act such amendments will also be effected by 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚĂƚĂƌĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘,ĞŶƌǇs///ĐůĂƵƐĞƐ ? ?89 This power may be 
ƵƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?ƌĞŵĞĚǇŽƌŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĂŶǇĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚhůĂǁƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?Žƌ
any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ? ?90 ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ‘under this section may make any provision that could be 
ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ ĂŶ Đƚ ŽĨ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?91   ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ŝƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁŽĨ Ă
relevant Minister.
92
  ‘ĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŽĨƚǁŽƚǇƉĞƐ P ŝŶŽƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚh
ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŽŶ-ĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞůŝƐƚŽĨ ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚh
ůĂǁ ? ?93  Both types have implications for health law. 
We noted one such example of a pŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĂďŽǀĞ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ
ĨŽƌĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ŶŽ-ĚĞĂů ?Žƌ ‘ĐƌĂƐŚŽƵƚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ ?Clause 9 of the Withdrawal Bill 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ  ‘make such provision as the Minister considers 
appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŽŶŽƌďĞĨŽƌĞĞǆŝƚĚĂǇ ? ?94  ‘DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ
context is defined
95
 by reference to the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, which refers to the 
UK government (and not to ministers in the devolved nations/regions). If this power is as 
sweeping as it appears, every aspect of health law outlined above, as pertaining to the 
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 House of Commons Health Committee, 6th Report, Brexit and health and social care  W people and process, 
paras 28-69, HC640 28 April 2017 
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 M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2014), pp. 136-138. Henry VIII clauses 
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92
 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 7 (2). 
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 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 7 (2). 
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 See also White Paper, Para 1.18. The Withdrawal Bill explicitly excludes the power to implement the 
withdrawal agreement from the enabling power in clause 7, which applies after Brexit day, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 7 (6) (d).  
95
  European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, clause 14 (1). 
withdrawal agreement, could potentially be altered by executive action taken at Whitehall. 
So  W for instance  W a change to the rights of R-EU nationals to access healthcare in the UK, 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ? Žƌ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŶŽ-ĚĞĂů ? ƌĞǆŝƚ ? ǁŽƵůĚ
according to the Bill be something that the Westminster government had power to 
implement through delegated legislation, without involving the devolved nations/regions, 
even though access to healthcare is a devolved power. 
A second ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŝŶƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚhůĂǁ ?ŝƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŽƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨh entities 
(such as, for instance, the European Medicines Agency) to be carried out instead by a UK 
public authority  W either already-existing (such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency
96
), or newly-established under the powers given in the Withdrawal Bill.
97
 
Such functions may include adopting laws, or providing funding. Alternatively, functions of 
h ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ  ‘ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ? ĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚ ? Žƌ ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?98 The reference to 
 ‘ĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇ ŝŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ƌĞĚ ƚĂƉĞ ? ŽĨ h ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ƐŽ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ŝŶ >ĞĂǀĞƌƐ ? ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? &ŽƌŵĂůůǇ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ŝůů ŐŝǀĞƐ
power to UK ministers to remove all marketing authorisation rules from pharmaceuticals 
sold in the UK, or all food safety law, or all environmental protections, if these are deemed 
 ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ h ůĂǁ ?   ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ŝƐŶŽƚ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝůů ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
Explanatory Notes
99
 ƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞůĂǁŝƐ not deficient merely because a minister considers 
ƚŚĂƚhůĂǁǁĂƐĨůĂǁĞĚƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĞǆŝƚ ? ? 
 ƚŚŝƌĚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă ĨƵƚƵƌĞ  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ŝŶ ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ h ůĂǁ ? ŝƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ h ůĂǁ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
requires and facilitates information-sharing with EU institutions.  In health law contexts, this 
includes sharing information on fitness to practice of health professionals within the 
Internal Market Information System,
100
 sharing pharmacoviligence information as part of 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ĐŽĚĞ ? ŽŶ ƉŚĂƌŵĂĐĞƵƚŝĐĂůƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?101 or sharing data on cancer 
outcomes,
102
 or emerging on communicable disease threats,
103
 ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ
policies. The eventual details here will depend on the withdrawal agreement, and whether 
some information-sharing continues. The Withdrawal Act will give power to the UK 
government to remove the information-giving obligation from the UK statute book.
104
  If the 
h< ůĞĂǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ h ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŶŽ ĚĞĂů ? ? ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů
agreement fail, the Act would give executive power to remove regulatory oversight in a host 
of areas pertaining to health, without parliamentary or other stakeholder oversight.  The 
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implications for health law would be particularly stark if the UK government pursues an 
ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ŽĨ  ‘ĐƵƚƚŝŶŐ ƌĞĚ ƚĂƉĞ ? ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ Ă ůŽǁ ƌĞŐƵlation economy, as some government 
information has suggested may be on the table.
105
  This will certainly be an area where 
oversight by health lawyers will be crucial.  
Fourth, the Bill permits use of executive powers where necessary for the UK to continue to 
comply with its international obligations.
106
 The UK currently complies with a host of 
international obligation relevant to health law through its membership of the EU. Import of 
radioisotopes for use in cancer treatment is one example; food safety law undĞƌƚŚĞhE ?Ɛ
Codex Alimentarius another. Compliance with standards set by the International Council on 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
hƐĞŽŶ ‘ŐŽŽĚĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƚƌŝĂůƐĨŽƌƉŚĂƌŵĂĐĞƵƚŝĐĂls is a third.107 
Even with the text of the Bill, it is difficult to say how sweeping the uses of this executive 
ƉŽǁĞƌǁŝůůďĞŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ‘ƐƵŶƐĞƚĐůĂƵƐĞƐ ? ?ůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐŝƚƐƵƐĞŝŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽ
the withdrawal agreement to Brexit day itself,
108
 and otherwise to two years from Brexit 
day.
109
 There is a list of exclusions, for instance protecting the Human Rights Act from 
amendment using these powers.
110
   
Otherwise, however, potential for extensive powers and broad ministerial discretion 
remains.
111
 Then the question arises as to what means exist to hold this power to account. 
dŚĞ ƉƌŝĐĞ ŽĨ ,ĞŶƌǇ s/// ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƚ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ?
Specifically, reviewability of executive action and secondary legislation adopted under these 
clauses take the form of judicial review. This empowers the Administrative Court to quash, 
prohibit, or compel certain exercises of power on the grounds of illegality, 
unreasonableness, or procedural impropriety.
112
 There is a world of difference between a 
prŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚhůĂǁ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŽĨůĂĐŬŽĨŽƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ
non-compliance with international obligations, once the UK is outside the EU; and a 
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ ůĂǁ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĂŶ ŽƉƚŝmal regulatory 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?/ƚŵĂǇƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇƚŚĂƚƵƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝůů ?Ɛ,ĞŶƌǇs///
clauses in the latter instance are illegal or unreasonable.  However, judicial review is 
inadequate for two primary reasons: first, its relative inaccessibility; and second, the 
exclusion of any parliamentary involvement. 
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The Administrative Court is overloaded with applications.
113
 To mitigate this, stringent 
criteria are imposed; applicants must comply with locus standi rules, bring their case within 
a reasonable time, and ultimately be subject to a highly discretionary determination of 
whether or not their case is arguable. In conjunction with limited legal aid,
114
 bringing a case 
for judicial review is highly challenging. If thĞ ŝůů ?Ɛ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ,ĞŶƌǇ s/// ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ
increased litigation,
115
 an even higher threshold may be inescapable. The alternative is 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞůĂǇƐĂŶĚ ?ĂƐ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ  ‘ĚĞůĂǇĞĚ ŝƐ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞĚĞŶŝĞĚ ? ?116 neither outcome would ensure 
effective reviewability. The bottom line is that using the courts is not going to be an 
appropriate means to secure protection for health in the run up to and immediate 
aftermath of Brexit. 
Further, even where a case is brought, judicial review of Henry VIII powers bypasses 
Parliament completely.
117
 Any legislation or acts adopted are determined solely by the 
executive and they are only subject to judicial scrutiny and common law rules.
118
 The only 
saving grace is that recent case law has demonstrated a suspicion towards delegated 
legislation that undermines primary legislation. As this represents a contradiction of the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, Lord Neuberger has advocated a particularly 
scrupulous approach.
119
 
The Withdrawal Bill has been widely criticised for its potential effects on parliamentary 
control and scrutiny.
120
 These effects have particular ramifications in the context of health 
law  W for two reasons. First, the nature of health law is such that democratic processes are 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ǀĞŶǁŚĞƌĞŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŵĂĚĞŚĂǀĞ
significant normative implications, including ĨŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ůŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
even their identities.   
Second, much of health law is a devolved power in the UK.  Giving power to Whitehall to 
alƚĞƌ ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚhůĂǁ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚǁŝƚŚŝŶ
the UK. The White Paper notes that changes to devolved law would be better made by 
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devolved institutions.
121
 But it is light on detail as to what counts as a change to devolved 
law, in particular where the change emanates from a future EU/UK agreement (which by 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?  dŚĞ tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ŝůů ?Ɛ
Schedule Two purports to set out the powers of devolved nations/regions
122
 to amend 
 ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚh ůĂǁ ? ? >ŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŵĂůů ƉƌŝŶƚ ?Ăƚ ŚĞ  ‘ďĂĐŬ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŝůů ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
 ‘ĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐ ? ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŚŝĚĚĞŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚ ?123 In particular, Dunt highlights paragraph 3 (2) of 
Schedule Two
124
 which states that devolved assemblies cannot make any changes 
 ‘ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ? dŚŝƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h<
could apply reduced standards to areas previously governed by EU law and the devolved 
nations/regions would be unable to retain the higher threshold. The ScotƐ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ
alcohol taxation
125
 ŵŝŐŚƚďĞ Ă ĐĂƐĞ ŝŶƉŽŝŶƚ ? ŝĨ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚh ůĂǁ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ
interpreting exemptions in Treaty provisions on free movement, alongside the EU legislation 
that organises the EU market in agricultural products (in this case alcoholic beverages). It 
could also make it impossible for the devolved nations/regions to continue to offer access to 
health care to R-EU nationals, even though access to health care is a devolved power. It will 
be important for health lawyers in the devolved nations/regions to argue for the maximum 
retention of devolved powers. The devolved nations/regions effectively have the power to 
veto an agreement to the effect that a UK-level approach is needed,
126
 because, without 
their assent, executive instruments made under the Bill can effectively be annulled, so long 
as the devolved nations/regions deploy the procedure in Schedule 7. 
Under the Withdrawal Act, the UK courts will be permitted to continue to look to the ways 
in which the CJEU interprets EU law where they are interpreting Žƌ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚh
ůĂǁ ? ?127 UK courts may refer to CJEU decisions taken after Brexit day if they consider it 
appropriate to do so.
128
  The question of appropriateness will of course depend on how UK 
courts interpret that text in the context of their understanding of the Parliamentary aims 
embodied in the Act.  If their focus is on consistency, the aim may be understood as to 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ h< ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ h ůĂǁ ? ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ h
provisions on which it was originally based. It would therefore be appropriate to consider 
CJEU judgments issued after Brexit day.  This is because when the CJEU interprets a text, it is 
 ‘ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŚĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐŵĞĂŶƚ ?ŶŽƚĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?Žƌ ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?/Ĩ ?
on the other hand, ƚŚĞh<ĐŽƵƌƚƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?ƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƚŚĞĐƚŵĂǇďĞ
understood as to ensure that UK courts depart from the future directions of EU law, as 
expressed in CJEU judgments after Brexit day. 
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There is, of course, a significant difference between an enabling clause (UK courts may 
consider rulings of the CJEU) and the current position which is that UK courts are obliged to 
follow the authoritative interpretations of the CJEU of provisions of EU law, or provisions of 
h<ůĂǁǁŚŝĐŚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞh< ?s EU obligations.129 That obligation continues as a matter of 
h< ůĂǁ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ŝůů ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ ? ǁŝůů ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
decisions of the CJEU up to Brexit day.
130
 dŚŝƐĞŵďŽĚŝĞƐƚŚĞh< ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǀŝƐĂ
vis the CJEU. But whether that is the definitive position in UK law post-Brexit will in practice 
depend on what happens in the negotiations in terms of the position of the CJEU in the 
withdrawal agreement, and indeed potentially in any eventual future EU/UK agreement or 
agƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? tŚĂƚƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐ ŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůŝůů  ‘ǁŝůůŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ
ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ :h ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?131 ŶŽƚŝŶŐ  ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂǇ ? ƚŚĞ ŝůů
ĂůůŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ h< ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ůĂǁƐ ? ?132 although this may turn out not to be 
feasible if the withdrawal agreement (or any future EU/UK agreements) mandate(s) 
something different.   
dŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ:h ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ
ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞntal Rights.133  So  W for instance  W the UK 
courts will continue to be required to refer to EU CFR-ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ
h ůĂǁ ? ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ƌƵůŝŶŐ ŝŶBritish American 
Tobacco,
134
 which referred expůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƚŽ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? h&Z ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ŝŶ
interpreting EU tobacco regulations.  The nature of the constitutional obligation on UK 
courts will change, though: the status of pre-ƌĞǆŝƚĚĂǇ:hĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ? ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ? ?ŝƐ
such that the Supreme Court may depart from it in circumstances where the Supreme Court 
would depart from its own previous rulings, and the Scottish High Court of Justiciary may do 
ƐŽǁŚĞŶƐŝƚƚŝŶŐĂƐĂŶĂƉƉĞĂůĐŽƵƌƚŽƌŚĞĂƌŝŶŐĂ>ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?135   
Throughout the White Paper and the Withdrawal Bill, and consistent with the narrative of 
 ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨh<ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚĂůůƚŚĂƚŝŵƉůŝĞƐĨŽƌ
the behaviour of the UK courts, is reasserted. EU law will (obviously) no longer be a supreme 
source of UK law.
136
  The Factortame ruling
137
 will be overturned by the Withdrawal Act.  
Changing this balance of power between Parliament and the UK courts is an aspect of Brexit 
that may have significant implications for UK health law that have yet to be fully thought 
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through. Any instances where UK courts have relied on EU law-compliant interpretations of 
UK health law would be vulnerable to change.
138 
 
4. Conclusions: risks and opportunities in the immediate future, and longer term 
agendas 
Overall, there is no doubt that Brexit is bad for health.  But different forms of Brexit have 
different implications.
139
  As the UK leaves the EU, those who are concerned about health, 
ƚŚĞE,^ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂǁƚŚĂƚŐŽǀĞƌŶƐŝƚ ?ŚĂǀĞĂƌŽůĞƚŽƉůĂǇƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ůĞĂƐƚǁŽƌƐƚ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ
for health possible. In the immediate future, that means scrutiny of the withdrawal 
agreement, and the terms of the Withdrawal Bill, as well as future primary and secondary 
legislation that is brought forward in Parliament. 
There may even be some small opportunities. At a time of significant constitutional change, 
great uncertainty, and openness, matters that seemed impossible to even put onto 
governmental agendas may suddenly become more feasible.  There will be more or less 
legal space or constraint, depending on the terms of the withdrawal agreement and of any 
future EU/UK (trade) agreement(s).  But any aspect of EU law that does not work terribly 
effectively in health contexts could be revisited.  Some health professionals would like to 
revisŝƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƌƵůĞƐ ?140  The negative effects of EU public 
procurement law on NHS contracting behaviour could be mitigated.  The UK could review its 
decision that UK-sourced plasma is unfit for those under the age of 21, and cease to rely on 
Austrian imports.  Despite the lessons from the Poly Implant Prothese breast implant affair, 
the EU has failed to bring together its rules on marketing pharmaceuticals with those on 
more complex medical devices.
141
 The UK could offer better patient protection here. Some 
of the ways in which EU pharmaceuticals law operates have not kept up with technological 
developments, and may be unnecessarily risk averse.  There is scope for bringing together 
marketing authorisation decisions based on safety and efficacy, with those based on 
comparative clinical and cost effectiveness (health technology assessment).
142
  Leaving the 
EU means that the UK can, if it wishes, adopt new rules for air or water quality, waste 
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disposal, marketing food, alcohol and tobacco within the UK. All of this type of law can have 
significant effects on public health, particularly of children. Depending on the future EU/UK 
(trade) agreement(s), trade rules could exist and could be interpreted in ways that are 
similarly supportive of health to those of EU law.  But there are dangers too.  Outside of the 
h ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝĨ ƚŚĞh<ĂĚŽƉƚƐĂ  ‘ůŽǁƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ? ůŽǁƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ ŝƚƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?
the current legal protections for consumers, patients and the population will (eventually) no 
longer be in place. 
&ŽƌWDDĂǇ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞ ‘Ă ŐƌĞĂƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?143  Because health, 
and the NHS, was important in the referendum, the health community have at this moment 
a significant piece of political capital and resource for governmental time and attention.  The 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ůĂǁǇĞƌ :ƵŶĞ KƐďŽƌŶ ŚĂƐ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?  ‘ZŝŐŚƚƐƚĂůŬ ďƵǇƐ ƚĞŶ ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? / ƵƐĞ ŝƚ ůŝŬĞ Ă ŵĂŐŝĐ ǁĂŶĚ ? ?144 A crucial factor in the EU referendum was the 
pervasive belief that leaving the EU would mean ŵŽƌĞŵŽŶĞǇĨŽƌƚŚĞE,^ ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĞǆŝƚďƵƐ ? ?
upon which this lie
145
 was emblazoned, along with the official NHS logo, became an iconic 
image of the campaign. Health lawyers and those in the health policy community can use 
the lie about the NHS on the Brexit bus ĂƐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ‘ŵĂŐŝĐǁĂŶĚ ? ?ĞƉůŽǇĞĚũƵĚŝĐŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ŝƚ
ǁŝůůĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-Brexit future, 
which can be used to argue for as healthy a Brexit as feasible. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Jean McHale, Mark Flear, Nicholas Fahy, Martin McKee, Alastair 
Breckenridge, Jonathan Montgomery, Teresa Allen, Steve Peers, Jo Shaw, Jolyon Maugham, 
Jessica Cheung, Sarah McCloskey, the participants at the workshop on Health Law and the 
UK: Where now after Brexit?, Birmingham, 4 May 2017, and many others with whom I have 
discussed the effects of Brexit on health. I would also like to acknowledge Sarah 
DĐůŽƐŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŽƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ^ŚĞĨĨŝĞůĚ >Ăǁ ^ĐŚŽŽů ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ 
that assistance. Support from the ESRC UK in a Changing Europe (Brexit) grant Health Law 
Outside the EU: Immediate, Intermediate and Long Term Impacts ES/R002053/1 is gratefully 
acknowledged. Any errors remain my own. 
 
                                                          
143
  ‘ĂƐ ĚĞƐĂƐƚƌƂƐĞ ƌĞǆŝƚ-ŝŶŶĞƌ ?Frankfurther Allgemeine (2017) http://www.faz.net/aktuell/brexit/juncker-
bei-may-das-desastroese-brexit-dinner-14993605.html (accessed 13 July 2017). 
144
 J. Osborn, Harvard Law School and François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights Workshop, 
Economic and Social Rights and the Right to Health, September 1993, 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publications/economic1.html http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/EconomicandSocialRightsandtheRighttoHealth.pdf, p. 8. 
145
  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ PsŽƚĞ>ĞĂǀĞĐĂŵƉĂďĂŶĚŽŶ ? ? ? ?ŵ-a-ǁĞĞŬE,^ǀŽǁŝŶŚĂŶŐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶƉůĂŶƐ ? ?The Independent 
(2016) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-nhs-350m-a-week-eu-change-britain-
gisela-stuart-referendum-bus-a7236706.html (accessed 13 July 2017). 
